While not
entirely prepared to abandon the hermeneutic model of art as “at once surface
and symbol,” Oscar Wilde’s preface to The
Picture of Dorian Gray cautions the reader that “those who go beneath the
surface do so at their peril” (Wilde 4). Exactly one hundred years later,
Frederick Jameson sees
an evolving view of art in which “depth is replaced by surface, or by multiple
surfaces” as one of the constitutive elements of postmodern culture (Jameson
12). For both writers, this concept of art’s “surface” mobilizes a spatial metaphor
in which the material aspect of an artwork enfolds or hovers above an interior
meaning or moral. Since this spatial metaphor occupies a central place in
Jameson’s discussion of depth as something absent
from the postmodern, I was surprised to see the claim that “our psychic experience,
our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather than
categories of time” (16). In this post, I am interested in putting Wilde and
Jameson in dialogue to more fully explore the roles of space and time in each
writer’s conception of artistic expression, to ask if space and spatial
metaphors inform Jameson’s discussion of the modern as well as the postmodern, and to suggest that “categories
of time” and “categories of space” may in fact be mutually constitutive.
For
Jameson, postmodern depthlessness results not only from the increasing
superficiality of art – its increasing resistance to hermeneutic probing – but also
from a “waning of affect,” or a decrease in emotional expression. This
vanishing concept, Jameson explains, “presupposes some separation within the
subject, and along with that a whole metaphysics of the inside and outside, of
the wordless pain within the monad and the moment in which, often
cathartically, that ‘emotion’ is then projected out and externalized” (11). Like
a work of art in a hermeneutic situation, an emotion becomes divided between an
externalized surface, the human body (corresponding to the artistic medium), and
the affect (meaning) that exists “within,” “inside,” - Wilde might add “beneath”
- it.
Additionally, this description of expression shows that the
division between surface and interior has a temporal dimension; the interior
affect exists prior to being “projected out and externalized.” Earlier, in a
discussion of Van Gogh’s shoes, Jameson suggested that the hermeneutic approach
to art requires viewers “to reconstruct some initial situation of of which the finished
work emerges” (7). Mixing this description of hermeneutics with the description
of emotional expression above and applying the resulting (spatio-temporal) “depth
model” to Munch’s The Scream, which
is “a canonical expression” in both the artistic and the emotional sense, we as
viewers might imagine that the subject of the painting (the screaming homunculus,
or Munch himself) is in the process of emerging from an “initial situation” of “wordless
pain,” punctuated now by the “moment” of cathartic expression captured on Munch’s
canvas.
Of course, the temporality becomes fuzzy here, and not
only because what is captured on canvas has no material past outside this one moment of expression. As viewers –
hermeneutic readers – we actually experience the temporal movement of affect to
expression backward. Working from the
expression, the material surface in front of us, we would reconstruct the initial
situation, the interior affect that inspired it. This movement backward in time
is also a movement inward in space, from a (present) surface to a (past (and
present?)) interior.
This proliferation of pasts and presents, surfaces and
interiors offers an excellent door through which to introduce Dorian Gray, a
character famous for hiding his ugly past behind a surface “of extraordinary
personal beauty” (Wilde 5). Dorian represents the failure of expression in so
far as his interior, his personal history of crimes and negative affects,
fails to inscribe itself on the surface of his physical body. (Here, it’s
important to note that nineteenth-century physiognomy would expect a body’s
moral and personal history to manifest itself in the body’s physical appearance.
Wilde’s novel relies on a highly literal understanding of the phenomenon.) Dorian Gray is also a classic example of discontinuity between “essence and appearance,”
one of the depth models that Jameson believes has been eclipsed in postmodern
thought. Dorian’s essence, “the real
degradation of his life” and “the hideous corruption of his soul” (118), has
been separated from his bodily appearance in being transferred onto/into his
portrait.
In fact, this classic reading of Wilde's text obscures what is potentially
interesting about its engagement with the problematic of
surfaces. Dorian’s essence and appearance are not divided between an interior
and a surface, but between two spatially and temporally distinct surfaces – his
body, suspended forever outside of a “moment of expression,” and the painted
canvas of his portrait, which changes concurrently with each moment of Dorian’s
personal history. In their identical qualities and temporalities, the spaces of
Dorian’s interior essence and the painted surface collapse, until Dorian is
able to say sincerely to the painter of his portrait “[my soul] is your own
handiwork” (146). What fragments Dorian’s subjectivity is not a spatial division
of interior/exterior, but a temporal split between one surface that is outside
of, and one that is immersed in time.
4 comments:
These intersections of temporal and spatial surfaces are really interesting to me, theoretically speaking--though I haven't before thought of them as linked to post/modern historical moment/s. Perhaps this post makes arguments not only about artistic expression but also about forms of reading--how these might be particular to historical moments, or something like that. I'm reminded of something Heather Love wrote about what she and others call "surface reading" and hermeneutics; her essay is titled "Close but not Deep" (here's a link: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nlh/summary/v041/41.2.love.html).
I'm curious about the relationship between what you call subjectivity and expression in the last bit of this post, though--because the equivalence that you suggest probably belies some assumptions about the relationship of these two notions, though I can't really pinpoint what these assumptions are. Maybe this is also an equivalency that Jameson suggests (and I'll readily admit that I find Jameson pretty opaque). Might the relationship of subjectivity to expression be characterized as a surface or interface?
Hi Aaron, thanks for a super thought-provoking comment!
Great point about surface reading – the dialectic of surface reading vs. the “hermeneutics of suspicion” is definitely using the same spatial metaphor as Jameson. It’s the whole idea that the material or formal characteristics of a text provide an exterior surface that can be approached distinctly from a concealed interior meaning. The metaphor is definitely enduring - the Greeks had hyponoia, “under-sense,” as one level of meaning in a text - and even as we talk about new forms of reading (or new forms of artistic production, as Jameson does), I suspect we’ll be coming back to the idea of surfaces and interiors (even if our project is, like Love, to privilege one over or to the exclusion of the other).
That’s one question I have about the surface reading project, actually: to the extent that it constructs itself in opposition to the hermeneutics of suspicion (for Jameson, just “hermeneutics”), would it be able to sustain itself as a reading practice without a practiced hermeneutics to push back against? Put another way: can a surface exist without at least the conception of an interior? The question of how forms of reading are particular to historical moments and if/how they travel beyond those moments would be a fascinating one for sure. I might lump “models of reading” in there, too – what is the relationship between, for example, Plato’s hyponoia and Jameson’s “vaster reality which replaces [the material work of art] as ultimate truth”?
Thanks for catching my verbal sloppiness in the last paragraph! :-) I’m using “subjectivity” as shorthand for the “dialectic of essence and appearance” which Jameson, while arguing that it “presupposes some separation within the subject,” does NOT equate with subjectivity. (Though I think Lee Patterson does use “subjectivity” in the sense of “separation within an individual’s conception of hirself,” and that must be where I picked it up.)
I was (and still am) really fuzzy about "subjectivity"; it feels really slippery where I've read it in the texts. Just wasn't sure about context there. (I've probably made the same elision somewhere as well.)
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